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Of all their various qualities and achieve-
ments, why is it apparently most important to Nietzsche that
Socrates was ugly, and that Caesar suffered from terrible
headaches? And how do Caesar’s headaches contribute to
his status as “the highest type of free man”? This paper pres-
ents an interpretation of the concept of freedom in Niet-
zsche’s late book, Twilight of the Idols.1 A main focus will
be the passage Twilight “Skirmishes” 38, entitled “My Con-
ception of Freedom.” It is helpful to pick out only one of Ni-
etzsche’s texts, because he changes his mind so much
throughout his writings.2 However, by focusing on Twilight,
I do not mean to suggest that this represents Nietzsche’s best
or most mature account of freedom. Nor do I present this as
something like his “considered position” on freedom, what-
ever one takes that dubious phrase to mean. While Nietzsche
isn’t consistent across his various texts, I will be assuming
for the purposes of this paper that he is consistent within
Twilight. So, for example, if he says something about a par-
ticular person in one place, I’ll assume that it is connected to
what he says about that same person in another place (and
that the reader is meant to make that connection). This will
be significant later on.
I intend, furthermore, to emphasize an aspect of Niet-
zsche’s writing which has received relatively little attention
from critics: namely, the way he writes about famous people.
A very helpful way of approaching Nietzsche is to look at
the kinds of questions that he asks, rather than the kinds of
answers that he gives. More often than not, he isn’t inter-
ested in the internal structure of a metaphysical, religious, or
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moral view; rather, he’s interested in the kind of person who
holds such a view. The question is not: “Is view X correct?”
Rather, Nietzsche asks, “What kind of person would hold
view X?” or “What kind of psychological (or physiological)
need might be served by becoming an adherent of X?” This
is particularly effective (and this is not often brought out)
because the views Nietzsche discusses most frequently (e.g.,
Christianity, Kantianism, liberalism) are, he thinks, obvi-
ously and comprehensively false. This obvious falsity moti-
vates the switch from questions about empirical evidence
and internal logic to questions about why on earth some-
body would believe something so stupid. A beautiful exam-
ple of this is the comment about Christianity in The
Anti-Christ: “One is not ‘converted’ to Christianity—one
must be sufficiently sick for it.”3 Christianity is so evidently
false that one must look to the underlying lack of health in
the Christian to explain his worldview.
Of course, if this is Nietzsche’s general outlook—that
philosophies, religions, and values often come after or in re-
sponse to the needs of the people who hold them—then we
shouldn’t be too surprised to find him writing about real
people and how they relate to their value systems. That is
one of the reasons why Nietzsche’s writing is littered with
the names of the famous. Often these do not function merely
as examples, but have a more intricate connection with the
subject matter. In The Anti-Christ, Paul’s psychology is inti-
mately connected with Christianity such that the two are in-
separable: in a certain sense, Christianity is just a function of
Paul’s asceticism.4 The same might be said for Wagner and
modern music in The Wagner Case, or for Euripides and the
decline of tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy. This paper con-
centrates on individuals in Twilight who relate to freedom:
Caesar, Napoleon, and Catiline. We can’t understand free-
dom (in Twilight) unless we take time to understand these
individuals; and, I’ll go on to argue, an understanding of
them helps us to understand the most significant character in
Twilight: Socrates.
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Finally, I’ll try to say something about Nietzsche’s writing
and his style. To put it roughly, I argue that Nietzsche does-
n’t really know why he’s writing Twilight; that correspond-
ingly, we don’t as readers understand how to respond to it;
and finally, that Nietzsche expresses an awareness of this in
the text. I want to present Nietzsche in a dilemma: for cer-
tain reasons, he wants to change the way the world is; for
other reasons, he suggests that he doesn’t know quite how to
achieve this, and perhaps that it isn’t even possible. As I say,
this third claim must remain vague for the moment; I shall
return to it towards the end.
My interest in Nietzsche’s reasons for writing Twilight
(and in how readers might respond to it) arises, in part, as a
response to a certain kind of Nietzsche criticism which is
prevalent at the moment. It is common to offer an analysis
of Nietzsche which ultimately produces an “ought” or a
take-home message of some kind. There is a sense that Niet-
zsche must be telling us what to do and it’s just a question of
reading him carefully or selectively enough to draw this out.
One problem here is that the resultant “oughts” are often
rather peculiar. Anybody who has been to a Nietzsche talk
and been told to “become what you are” or “lay yourself
down for the Superman” may have an inkling of what I’m
getting at. It would be foolish to say that Nietzsche never
gives his readers moral instruction. However, one of my in-
terests here lies in presenting a case in which he very defi-
nitely does not. Thus, in the present case, Nietzsche’s
conception of freedom does not give us a “you-ought-to-be-
come-free-like-this” answer. Of course, if Nietzsche isn’t
writing in order to get us to do something, then one may
well ask why he is writing at all. Writers may in general have
a wide variety of reasons for writing, and they needn’t have
only one reason. We might imagine Nietzsche’s writing as a
kind of self-exploration, although that doesn’t seem to be
the pose he strikes in Twilight. More likely, Twilight might
be written to unsettle its readership, rather than to offer
them a take-home message. Its subtitle—“How to Philoso-
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phize with a Hammer”—would certainly suggest that much.
I’ll return to these considerations, with respect to freedom in
Twilight, towards the end.
Two background concepts which are crucial to under-
standing Nietzsche’s conception of freedom in Twilight are
those of “the Unzeitgemässe” and “decadence.” As we shall
see, the two are related. The word unzeitgemässe is normally
translated into English as “untimely.” Hence we know the
Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen as the “Untimely Medita-
tions.” The section of Twilight which provides much of the
material for this paper is called Streifzüge eines Unzeit-
gemässen: “Skirmishes of an Untimely One.” The English
fails to capture the German. We rarely use “untimely” ex-
cept to speak of an “untimely death,” meaning usually that
the person died young. We could, I suppose, speak of the
“untimely” death of a very old man if he died as the result
of a clinical error or was murdered. Still, the point is that the
death occurred sooner than it should have. Conversely, a
“timely intervention” is one which happened at just the right
moment. The German carries a slightly different connota-
tion. To be zeitgemäss is, literally, to correspond to or be ap-
propriate to your time. So, whereas in English one only
really speaks of specific “timely” events or actions, in Ger-
man a person or institution might be zeitgemäss—appropri-
ate to its particular time.
The German (and my English explanation of the German)
nonetheless carries with it an ambiguity, which is worthy of
consideration. What is it to be appropriate to your time? This
could mean either (i) a typical product of your time or (ii)
just exactly what your time needs. When Adorno wrote that
the V1 rocket-bomb was the perfect symbol of the times (i.e.,
the Second World War),5 he meant that it was an embodi-
ment of everything that characterized the modern world as
he saw it; he didn’t mean that the V1 rocket was “appropri-
ate” in the sense that it was just what everyone needed. The
V1 rocket, then, was zeitgemäss in the first and not the sec-
ond sense. One can imagine an appropriateness that was ex-
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actly the other way around. It might be appropriate for a uni-
versity faculty which has an extremely narrow focus to ex-
pand and to become more diverse; but this is very unlikely to
come from within the faculty, and even if it did, it would
hardly be a typical product of the latter. (If it were a typical
product, then there wouldn’t have been a problem in the first
place.) Hence this kind of “appropriateness” would be of the
second kind, but not of the first. Finally, we can imagine an
appropriateness which is both a product of its time and what
its time needs. Nietzsche seems to have thought that the right
kind of society or social environment will do just that.
Hence, one way of interpreting Nietzsche’s admiration for
Greek culture (as expressed in The Birth of Tragedy) is that it
typically produced the very things that it needed, in the form
of certain works of art.
When it comes to the modern era (Nietzsche thinks) these
two ideas fall apart: it is characteristic of the modern age
precisely to fail to produce that which it needs. The Unzeit-
gemässe Betrachtungen—an early collection of essays—are
meditations which express untimely ideas; but they are also
meditations on the subject of the untimely, on the need for
untimely kinds of thinking. In that respect, the Unzeit-
gemässe Betrachtungen are a timely (i.e., much needed) in-
tervention in what Nietzsche sees as a modern catastrophe
of culture. It is appropriate (in the second sense, above) to
our time that we take an interest in that which is not of its
time (in the first sense): “If you want biographies, do not de-
sire those which bear the legend ‘Herr So-and-so and His
Age,’ but those upon whose title-page there would stand ‘A
Fighter against His Age.’”6
Although the term (un)zeitgemäss is ambiguous in the
manner described, for the rest of this paper I’ll use it (as I
think Nietzsche most often does) to mean “(not) a typical
product of the time.” That is, corresponding to the first of
the two senses given above. In Human, All Too Human, Ni-
etzsche gives, as an example, the zeitgemäss man who grows
up in the wine country and decides to become a wine-
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drinker.7 The point is clear enough: that’s exactly what we’d
expect of someone who grew up in the wine country.
I want to say a little more about the notion of the Unzeit-
gemässe (i.e., the atypical, etc.), which also carries with it
the sense of something unfashionable, unusual, out of place,
unexpected. There’s something distinctly uncomfortable
about being ein Unzeitgemässer: The Unzeitgemässe Betra-
chtungen have therefore been rendered the “Thoughts out
of Season” or “Unfashionable Observations.”8 Although
much changed in Nietzsche’s thought, two broad ideas seem
to have remained constant with regard to the Unzeit-
gemässe. First, Nietzsche thinks (and this is surely right)
that in general your values are the product of what we
might call your “context,” where that includes (among
other things) your education, century, language, nationality,
and inherited traits.9 However, more often than not, our
values do not seem to us to be context-dependent; instead,
we feel as though we have chosen them because they are
right, just, or true; we even think that we haven’t chosen
them at all—that they have chosen us. Perhaps the most fa-
mous example from Nietzsche’s work lies in On the Ge-
nealogy of Morals.10 There, he argues that Christian values
claim to be universal and context-independent, but in fact
they are highly contingent. The project of the Genealogy is
to explain the contingent, psychological history of how
these values came about.11
The Unzeitgemässe is, for Nietzsche, a pro tanto cause for
admiration. Whoever you are, and in whatever respect, if
you are unzeitgemäss then Nietzsche shows respect for you.
But note that being unzeitgemäss in itself isn’t sufficient for
full, unqualified admiration. As we shall see, Nietzsche’s
Catiline is unzeitgemäss, but he is also a degenerate, dys-
functional wreck. Similarly, Nietzsche accords Jesus some
credit for being unzeitgemäss;12 but given that he does so in
a book called The Anti-Christ, we may be justified in think-
ing that his admiration is somewhat qualified.
Second, there’s often some specific conception of what is
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zeitgemäss, what is typical of the age, in the pejorative sense.
That is to say: although Nietzsche always thinks that there’s
something wrong with the modern world, and that this
wrongness is passed from the context to the individual, he
doesn’t have a unitary conception of just what the problem
actually is. Hence, although he respects ein Unzeitgemässer
in general, he is often more interested in a particular kind of
Unzeitgemässe, which corresponds to a particular concep-
tion of what is wrong (and zeitgemäss) in our society. This
specific and problematic feature of the time changes, and
sometimes directly switches throughout his work. Hence, for
example, in the second of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen,
“On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life,” Nietzsche ar-
gues that what is wrong with our society is that we are much
too scientific: ein Unzeitgemässer in this context will set
himself free with certain kinds of artistic and philosophical
activity. Conversely, in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche
wastes no time in telling us that it is characteristic of our
times to ignore science in favor of art, philosophy, and reli-
gion: to be unzeitgemäss in that context is to take seriously
the lessons of science and the scientific method—this is a key
feature of Human, All Too Human’s “free spirit.” If the Un-
zeitgemässe is to play a part in our analysis, then it is im-
portant to identify the relevant feature of our society which
Nietzsche considers zeitgemäss. In Twilight, I argue, one is
zeitgemäss if one is “decadent.” Hence, I now turn to Niet-
zsche’s concept of decadence.
In Twilight, Nietzsche thinks that the negative and zeit-
gemäss feature of mankind is to be something he calls “deca-
dent.” What is this decadence? One way to answer this
might be to look at who Nietzsche thinks is decadent and
then work from there. But this approach is flawed, mostly
because he seems to think that everybody is decadent.
Drawn from across Twilight, Nietzsche’s list of decadents in-
cludes: Socrates or Greek contemporaries of Socrates;13
Christians and those with Christian values;14 Kant or Kan-
tians;15 Schopenhauer or Schopenhauerians;16 those who
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make mistakes or are unable not to react to a stimulus;17 lib-
erals;18 socialists and anarchists;19 the German Reich;20 Her-
bert Spencer;21 those who are excessively rational;22 and
those who are immoderate towards an enemy.23
It’s more helpful to look at what seems to lie behind Ni-
etzsche’s conception of decadence. In common with much
of his later work, Nietzsche’s interest lies not in the beliefs
of the various decadents but in their psychology. (It is no
accident that the working title for Twilight was “A Psychol-
ogist’s Leisure.”) It turns out that decadence is a psycholog-
ical configuration. Nietzsche puts this most concisely when
he describes Socrates’ decadent Greek contemporaries: “No
one was any longer master of himself, the instincts were
mutually antagonistic.”24 We all have instincts: instincts to
eat, drink, fight, flee, and so on. These have evolved to suit
our environment. However, Nietzsche offers a kind of his-
tory of our instincts and society, according to which these
instincts turn on each other and compete for control over
us. This antagonism can have a weakening effect upon us:
we no longer have a unitary purpose and must cope with
conflicting instincts. Nietzsche’s history of the instincts
seems to pan out as follows:
• We used to be instinctive and aggressive creatures.
• Civilized and urbanized, we can no longer rely on our in-
stincts, which turn against each other.
• The result is weakness, confusion, desperation, dissatis-
faction: “decadence.”
Obviously, there’s an important difference for Nietzsche
between “having instincts” and “acting instinctively”; both
play a part in this story. We all have instincts or drives which
make demands upon us. However, we do not all live instinc-
tively; that is to say, our instincts do not combine to guide us
in a particular way, so that we can act upon them without
reflection. In a sense, Nietzsche is outlining a history of what
happens to our instincts such that we can no longer act in-
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stinctively. In our pre-civilized past, we could live and be
guided by our instincts (i.e., act instinctively). Note also that
Nietzsche wants to say something about what those instincts
were like: to survive, we had to be aggressive—aggressive to
catch prey, aggressive towards predators, aggressive towards
competitors. In the modern context, we can no longer rely
upon these aggressive instincts, because no society could
function with such hostility allowed free rein. However, we
still feel the force of these aggressive instincts: they find ex-
pression by turning on each other.
Nietzsche often uses the phrase “disgregation of the in-
stincts”: the image is one of a herd, which used to move and
react together, but has disintegrated into a mass of conflict-
ing individuals. The disgregation, the lack of unity and pur-
pose, makes us weak, because we can no longer rely on
ourselves. We can no longer live instinctively. For Nietzsche,
decadence is intimately connected with the “herd morality.”
The choice of disgregation of the instincts as a cause for the
herd morality is instructive: humans in fact behave like a
herd—and develop a herd morality—due to the break-up of
an inner herd of instincts.
Once understood in this way, some (at least) of the deca-
dents on the long list above become more comprehensible.
Take liberalism, for example. The decadent man must rely
upon others, because his instincts are no longer a guide to
life. This other-reliance has, for Nietzsche, a further undesir-
able consequence. If I rely upon you for my survival—if I
cannot survive on my own—then there is a limit placed upon
the extent to which I am able to feel superior to you. A nat-
ural consequence of the decadent psychology might well be
a commitment to the notion that all men are equal—that all
should have equal rights or that all opinions ought to be
taken into consideration and are equally valid. The liberal-
decadent commitment to equality goes against a fundamen-
tal belief for Nietzsche about the strong (and thus good)
society. In Twilight, “Skirmishes” 37, Nietzsche summarizes
his attack on the value of equality: “The chasm between
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man and man, class and class . . . the will to be oneself, to
stand out—that which I call ‘pathos of distance’—character-
izes every strong age.” The great are great in virtue of the
feeling of difference between them and the ordinary. To
make all equal is not to raise the lowest to the level of the
highest, but rather to level down. Hence: “Liberalism: in
plain words, reduction to the herd animal.”25 Note that this
criticism of liberalism uses just the format I described above.
Nietzsche doesn’t discuss the internal complexities of liberal
theory; instead, he concludes that needing to adhere to such
a view is a sign of weakness.
I have said that the Unzeitgemässe remains important for
Nietzsche throughout his writing, but that his particular fo-
cus for what is zeitgemäss varies greatly. The relevant sense
of zeitgemäss in Twilight corresponds to Nietzsche’s con-
ception of decadence, of the instincts that have turned on
each other, and the resultant breakdown of the instinctive
life. So it is significant to note that Catiline, Napoleon, and
Caesar—the three figures used by Nietzsche to present free-
dom in Twilight—all have instincts which are unzeitgemäss
in their strength. The decadent/zeitgemäss man has conflict-
ing, confused, mutually antagonistic instincts; Catiline,
Napoleon, and Caesar are exceptions to this rule: they all
have unusually strong, unified, wild instincts. The “Lives”
Nietzsche writes for them trace their development in the
context of these strong instincts.
Nietzsche tells the story of three different lives which share
the same starting point (i.e., unusual strength and unity of
instinct). Catiline (the typical criminal) is destroyed by his
own strength; Napoleon (the “exception”) uses his strength
to dominate those around him; Caesar (the “free man”)
presents a combination of the admirable features of the
other two.
Catiline26 was a member of the Roman senatorial nobility
who tried to seize Rome by force, and he eventually died at
the hands of the senatorial army in 62 bc. Catiline and Cae-
sar are often compared as examples of how differently his-
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tory will treat you if you have the misfortune to lose rather
than win. Catiline died just thirteen years before Caesar
crossed the Rubicon—to succeed in taking control of Rome
where Catiline failed. History, it is argued, remembers Cae-
sar as a glorious hero; but if he’d lost he might have been re-
membered very differently. Catiline suffered particularly in
this regard. We have two main sources: first, Cicero, whom
Catiline tried to murder and whose main claim to fame was
his defeat of the Catalinarian conspiracy; second, Sallust,
who delights in presenting Catiline’s life as a tale of how bad
things happen to an Evil Man. Hence Sallust tells us imme-
diately that Catiline was “evil”: he had “a vicious and de-
praved nature” which was “possessed by an overpowering
desire for despotic power.”27 He “delighted in civil war,
bloodshed, robbery, and political strife”28 and kept the com-
pany of “debauchees, adulterers and gamblers . . . cut-
throats and perjurers.”29
I mention the Catiline/Caesar comparison not merely out
of interest, but also because (I’ll go on to argue) Nietzsche is
playing on this connection when he talks about Caesar. For
the moment, however, consider what Nietzsche says about
Catiline, who represents the “criminal type”:
The criminal type is the type of the strong human being under
unfavorable conditions, a strong human being made sick. What he
lacks is the wilderness, a certain freer and more perilous nature and
form of existence in which all that is attack and defense in the in-
stinct of the strong human being comes into its own.
Catiline is a “strong human being made sick”: he would
be at home in the wilderness, just as all human beings (or
their ancestors) in the long-distant past would have been.
However, whereas most are born weakened, decadent, and
fit for civilization, Catiline has the misfortune to be born
ready for the “attack and defense” of pre-civilized existence.
Catiline acts instinctively and aggressively, but he must con-
front a society which does not welcome such aggression: “It
is society, our tame, mediocre, gelded society in which a hu-
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man being raised in nature . . . necessarily degenerates into a
criminal. . . . He has never harvested anything from his in-
stincts but danger, persecution, disaster”; hence “his feelings
. . . turn against these instincts.”
Catiline meets nothing but “danger, persecution, disaster”
when he trusts his own instincts (acts instinctively). Hence,
of course, he begins to mistrust his instincts. In most cases,
the antagonism of the instincts among regular decadents
leads to weakness—a low-level but functional life devoid of
any great purpose or strength. However, when someone as
strong as Catiline experiences a turning inwards of the in-
stincts, the result is much more volatile. Rejected by society,
Catiline is completely destroyed. We might summarize Niet-
zsche’s account of his life as follows:
• Catiline’s instincts were too strong for his time.
• Therefore he was punished by society.
• Therefore he began to mistrust and turn against himself.
• Therefore he became “anemic” and “physiologically de-
generate.”
Catiline’s case is typical of the criminal. Stronger, aggressive,
more purposeful than those around him, he is crushed by so-
ciety’s hostility, which he eventually internalizes.
Where Catiline is “typical,” Napoleon’s case is the excep-
tion to the rule: “A human being raised in nature30 . . . nec-
essarily degenerates into a criminal. Or almost necessarily:
for there are cases in which such a human being proves
stronger than society: the Corsican Napoleon is the most fa-
mous example.”31
Nietzsche’s reference to “the Corsican Napoleon” is
meant, I think, to draw our attention to the very previous
section, in which he claims that Napoleon’s Italian heritage
enables him to take control of post-revolution France. France
after the revolution could never have produced a Napoleon
(perhaps because it was riddled with weak notions such as
Liberty and Equality, but Nietzsche isn’t explicit about this);
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but the Corsican Napoleon, who spoke French with an Ital-
ian accent, was “different.” Napoleon simply masters
France, due to his outsider’s strength. His similarity with
Catiline therefore ends at the first stage:
• Napoleon’s instincts were too strong for his time.
• Unlike Catiline, he was very much stronger than those
around him.
• Therefore, he was able to become master in post-revolu-
tion France.
Nietzsche is clearly impressed with the “genius” of
Napoleon.32 However, it is not Napoleon who is named the
free man (that title goes to Caesar). Why isn’t Napoleon
free? The answer is that he never had to face and overcome
the kind of self-doubt or inner conflict associated with the
experience of Catiline.
This implicit criticism of Napoleon is an instance of a larger
trend in the way Nietzsche attacks his targets: namely, to take
the property of the target which he (i.e., the target) considers
most secure and defining and then to attack him for being in-
sufficient in precisely this regard. Hence, for example, Niet-
zsche accuses Wagner (who had effectively created a festival in
his own honor) of not thinking big enough;33 and elsewhere
he attacks secular scientists for being too religious.34 In this
case, Nietzsche accuses Napoleon, victorious in some forty
battles, of not seeking out conflict. Of course, the accusation
is that Napoleon did not experience inner conflict. One can
compare Nietzsche’s Napoleon with Tolstoy’s on this question
of lack of inner conflict. As might be expected, Nietzsche (in
general) shows much more respect for Napoleon than does
Tolstoy; but both agree that he acts instinctively and without
any self-doubt. Thus Tolstoy describes a meeting between
Napoleon and Balashev, the Russian envoy. Balashev had met
him earlier that day—a meeting during which Napoleon ex-
ploded into an embarrassing fit of petulant rage. Balashev
now expects to find him ashamed and apologetic. Instead:
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[Napoleon] not only showed no sign of constraint or self-re-
proach on account of his outburst that morning, but, on the con-
trary, tried to reassure Balashev. It was evident that he had long
been convinced that it was impossible for him to make a mistake,
and that in his perception whatever he did was right, not because it
harmonized with any idea of right and wrong, but because he did
it.35
This might be helpful in understanding what Nietzsche is
getting at: Napoleon may have shaped the nineteenth cen-
tury (though Tolstoy would, of course, disagree with that),
but there’s something rather unimpressive about somebody
who achieves even such greatness without ever stopping to
question himself.
Napoleon and Catiline reflect two different features of
freedom. In Catiline, we find strong inner conflict without
outward mastery; his self-doubt crushes him. In Napoleon’s
case, we find outward mastery but a lack of inner conflict.
Caesar, the free man, combines the inner conflict with the
outward mastery. Another way of looking at this would be
to speak in terms of a “productive tension.” Nietzsche is
concerned with productive tension throughout his life, be-
ginning most famously with the tension between Apollo and
Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy. Like Heraclitus, Zarathustra
speaks of productive tension in terms of a bow and arrow:36
too little tension and the arrow won’t fly; too much tension
and the bow will break. It seems to me that in Catiline’s case
the bow has snapped and in Napoleon’s case it has never
been strung. We shall return to this important concept of
productive tension towards the end of the paper. For the mo-
ment, I turn to what Nietzsche says about Caesar, in the pas-
sage entitled “My Conception of Freedom”: “One would
have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest
resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps from
tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude. This
is true psychologically when one understands by ‘tyrants’
pitiless and dreadful instincts, to combat which demands the
maximum of authority and discipline towards oneself—
finest type Julius Caesar.”37
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The freest man is constantly overcoming a great resist-
ance: he is constantly in danger of being dominated and de-
stroyed, in this case by his inner instincts. Nietzsche
connects Caesar with the Catiline/Napoleon schema when
he claims that Catiline is a “phase of his development.”38
Earlier, I pointed out the traditional relation between Cati-
line and Caesar: that Caesar represents what Catiline would
have become, had he been successful.39 Nietzsche internal-
izes this structure within Caesar’s psychological develop-
ment: that is, he presents Caesar as having the same psychic
configuration as Catiline—but whereas Catiline was de-
stroyed by this inner turmoil, Caesar was able to overcome
it. Hence, Nietzsche claims, Catiline is “the antecedent form
of every Caesar.” Being Caesar (being free) requires over-
coming the Catalinarian existence. In this respect, the free
Caesar does represent the combination of the better parts of
Napoleon and Catiline:
• Caesar’s instincts were too strong for his time.
• He suffered as a result of having such strong instincts.
• Therefore he began to mistrust and turn against himself
(all stages so far identical to Catiline).
• Under normal circumstances, this would have led to
physiological degeneration and decadence.
• However, Caesar continued to struggle against these in-
stincts and he remained “aloft” and free.
Note that Caesar is not free-because-strongest or -noblest.
Instead, Nietzsche suggests that Caesar is somehow inter-
nally unstable. It takes all his effort to maintain control of
himself and he’s free because he (just) manages. I have al-
ready shown why Nietzsche considers liberalism a symptom
of decadence: unable to live instinctively and fend for our-
selves, unable to feel stronger and superior in relation to
others, we have to cling to equal rights for all. Nietzsche’s
conception of freedom is carefully contrasted with the liberal
(decadent) conception of freedom as equal rights. Before lib-
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eral policies are put in place (Nietzsche thinks), while liber-
als fight for their liberal institutions, liberals are in fact free.
But they are free because they are fighting for something,
against other people. However, the moment they succeed in
implementing their policies, they undermine freedom pre-
cisely because they make everyone equal and hence reduce
all to the same level.
Again, it’s helpful to think in terms of productive tension.
The tension between liberals and their enemies is productive;
during this struggle, they are in fact free in the Nietzschean
sense. But once in power, they undermine productive tension
between individuals by claiming that everyone is equal;
hence they lose the freedom they had while fighting. Niet-
zsche wants to emphasize that freedom is not, for him,
something a government or ruler can give to his subjects. It
is a feeling one has when one is struggling and fighting for
something.
With this in mind, I turn to one of the most enigmatic
characters in Nietzsche’s writing.
While Caesar, Napoleon, and Catiline feature relatively lit-
tle in Twilight, their lives (and their relationship to Niet-
zschean freedom) help us shed light on the most important
“Life” of Twilight: Socrates. Socrates had already played a
key role in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s earliest book,
and in Twilight, the last book Nietzsche saw through to pub-
lication, he is given his own chapter. A clear understanding
of Nietzsche on freedom in Twilight enables us to take a
fresh look at Nietzsche’s claims about Socrates in that book.
I have already named Socrates among Nietzsche’s long list
of decadents. This identifies him as one whose instincts are
in conflict, one who can no longer live instinctively. In fact,
Nietzsche had already, in The Birth of Tragedy,40 linked
Socrates to the decline of the instinctive life in Athens.
Aeschylus and Sophocles were instinctive artists; but it is
very important to Nietzsche (in The Birth of Tragedy) that
Socrates dislikes precisely that which is done “only by in-
stinct”: “‘only by instinct’: the phrase goes to the heart and
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center of the Socratic tendency. With these words Socrates
condemns existing art and existing ethics in equal meas-
ure.”41 For Socrates (in The Birth of Tragedy), everything
must be rationalized, nothing instinctive.
Initially, Twilight looks the same. Socrates the decadent, his
instincts in conflict, unable to live instinctively, struggles
among the noble, instinctive Athenians. Nietzsche describes a
weak, poor, bitter, ugly Socrates in a society which values
strength, wealth, and beauty. In a pure and noble society,
Socrates entertains “every foul vice and lust.” Deprived of the
usual means of achieving power or greatness, he adopts the di-
alectic method. This is a sign of weakness among the Atheni-
ans, who used to warn their children against it.42 The dialectic
method also allows Socrates to engage with the beautiful
Athenian youths: “Sokrates war auch ein grosser Erotiker.”43
In an essay on the epigram,44 Lessing argues that modern
epigrams internalize the role of the ancient epigram—the lat-
ter being found on statues and monuments. In the ancient
world, the passer-by saw a monument and asked himself
what the monument represented or commemorated; the epi-
gram existed to satisfy his curiosity. The modern epigram,
says Lessing, miniaturizes this structure. The writing itself
(acting as the monument) must arouse the curiosity of the
reader; then (performing the function of the ancient inscrip-
tion) it must satisfy this curiosity. For Lessing, then, a mod-
ern epigram should have a kind of natural break: before the
break the text arouses curiosity, and after the break the cu-
riosity is satisfied. The Nietzschean aphorism—prose, unlike
Lessing’s poetic epigram—retains something of this two-part
structure. Typically, the second part not only explains the
first part, but also casts it in a new light. The break becomes
a kind of twist or sting in the tail. Consider this aphorism
from the earlier Human, All Too Human: “Das Leben des
Feindes—Wer davon lebt, einen Feind zu bekämpfen, hat ein
Interesse daran, dass er am Leben bleibt.” (The life of the en-
emy—Whoever lives to fight an enemy has an interest in
keeping the enemy alive.)45
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The second part of this aphorism (“has an interest . . .”)
not only provides more information; it also forces us to re-
consider the first part. Whoever lives to fight an enemy had
better make sure the enemy isn’t destroyed, or else he would
lose his reason for living. Bearing that in mind, we come to
see “whoever lives to fight his enemy” in a completely new
light: namely that he isn’t trying to destroy his enemy, but
rather keep him alive so that life retains its significance. This
thought is given further attention in Twilight, when Niet-
zsche explores the notion of being “fruitful in opposition.”46
Although Twilight is not written in the strictly aphoristic
style that Nietzsche had previously employed,47 it retains
certain aphoristic features. Notably, Nietzsche is extremely
fond of this twist or break in the text, which forces the
reader to look back on the previous passage in a completely
revised light. This is one of the reasons why Nietzsche quo-
tations, taken out of context, are liable to give the wrong im-
pression—and why quotations from unpublished notes are
even more liable to mislead. Taking the Socrates chapter as a
whole, we find two such turns. Nietzsche is clear that
Socrates is a decadent. He is unable to rely upon himself and
we are told explicitly of the conflicting forces within him.
Yet Nietzsche doesn’t leave things there. At Twilight
“Socrates” 9, we find the first turn. Socrates looks around
him and realizes that “his case, his oddity of a case, was al-
ready unexceptional . . . old Athens was coming to an end.”
The picture until Twilight “Socrates” 9 presents a Socrates
in inner conflict, where the other Athenians are strong and
unified. Yet at Twilight “Socrates” 9, we realize that
Socrates was typical: everyone else was decadent too.
Socrates appears exceptional only in that he appears to pres-
ent a “cure” for decadence: namely, fanatical devotion to
reason and radical rejection of the passions (i.e., the subjects
of the following two chapters of Twilight).
If the first “turn” reveals to us that Socrates is unexcep-
tional, the second “turn” makes us think that perhaps he is
exceptional after all, but for different reasons. Nietzsche re-
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minds us in Twilight “Socrates” 12 that Socrates “chose to
die”: he could have escaped his death sentence, but he opted
out of life. Nietzsche interprets this death wish as a decision
by Socrates to escape his decadence. Having persuaded
Athens to follow the “Socratic methods” of reason,
Socrates himself realizes that this won’t work: “Rationality
at all costs . . . this itself was just an illness, a different ill-
ness. . . . Did [Socrates] himself understand this, that clever-
est of all self-out-witters? Did he ultimately tell himself this,
in the wisdom of his courage unto death? . . . Socrates
wanted to die.”48
Socrates understood what the so-called “Socratics” failed
to understand: that dying was the only way he could escape
decadence.49 How does this relate to the question of freedom
in Twilight? Nietzsche, I would argue, intends for us to make
a connection between Socrates and Caesar. Consider what
Nietzsche says about the psychology of the Socratic Greeks:
“Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere peo-
ple were but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo
was the universal danger. ‘The instincts want to play the
tyrant; we must devise a counter-tyrant who is stronger.’”50
Caesar, we are later told, is free because he is “five steps
from tyranny”51 and he struggles successfully to avoid being
tyrannized by his inner instincts. Yet this is also the position of
the Greeks who take on the Socratic methods. They too are
“five steps from excess,” which turns out to be the excess of
the tyrant-instincts. Nietzsche’s language here (“five steps . . .”)
suggests that he intends us to make this connection.
Socrates and the Socratics find themselves threatened with
inner tyrant-instincts. Caesar is unusual both in the strength
of the inner tyrants and in his ability to overcome them. Yet
notice what Socrates claims when he is accused of being
plagued by the most terrible inner vices and lusts: “‘That is
true,’ he said, ‘but I have become master of all of them.’”52
Socrates is claiming precisely Caesar’s freedom. He is claim-
ing that although he has the utmost inner conflict to contend
with, he has been able to overcome it.
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Of course, the methods we see Socrates employ in his life-
time (fanatical devotion to reason and radical opposition to
the passions) are a failure; much of Twilight is devoted to ex-
plaining how and why they are harmful. But by eventually
choosing death, Socrates does in a very limited sense achieve
Nietzschean freedom—or, at least, he faces up to its chal-
lenge. As he dies, Nietzsche’s Socrates acknowledges that
“Socrates is no physician”: he can’t cure the people of their
decadence.53 In Twilight “Skirmishes” 36, Nietzsche offers a
“morality for physicians.” In certain circumstances, he ar-
gues, when nothing is left for them, certain people ought to
choose death “accomplished at the right time, brightly and
joyfully, among children and witnesses.” Socrates didn’t ex-
actly die among children—he died among other philoso-
phers; but he surely gives us the most famous example of a
conscious, bright, joyful decision to die. For someone with-
out other options, Nietzsche claims, such a death is “the
most admirable thing there is: it almost earns you the right
to live.” It would be a “death chosen freely.”
In the Socrates chapter, Nietzsche asks the question, “Was
Socrates a typical criminal?” but he is careful not to answer it.
Only later do we understand the implications of this question.
As we have seen, the “typical criminal” is much later defined
via Catiline: unusually strong, he is broken by a society which
cannot support this strength. If Nietzsche is employing that
term with the sense he would later give it (an assumption, cer-
tainly, but not an unreasonable one), then this question raises
the possibility that Socrates was a strong figure made sick by
his decadent, weak contemporaries—precisely the opposite,
then, of the Socrates of The Birth of Tragedy. Just like Caesar,
Socrates confronts the resultant sickness; but he can only suc-
ceed by choosing to end his own life. In suicide, he achieves a
certain kind of freedom, and “almost earns the right to live.”
In spite of what he says, Socrates is a physician, but he is a
physician who “heals” only himself. Those around him fail to
understand the meaning of his death; they cling to the meth-
ods which he himself discarded.
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If Socrates achieves his (limited) freedom by choosing to
die, we may well wonder what Caesar does to stay free:
what are his methods for remaining aloft with respect to his
terrifying inner conflicts? In fact, Nietzsche does say some-
thing about how Caesar copes with such troubles. The list
consists of going on “long marches,” the “simplest form of
living,” “uninterrupted sojourn in the open air,” and “con-
tinuous toil.”54 I trust I am not alone in finding this some-
thing of an anticlimax. Surely there must be more to
Nietzschean freedom than joining the Boy Scout movement?
I suggested at the beginning that deriving a take-home
message from Nietzsche’s texts often seems to do them a se-
vere disservice. It’s not clear what the “message” should be
and it’s even less clear whether we can really take it to heart.
Nietzsche’s list of Caesar’s methods to combat his inner
tyrants is taken from Plutarch’s Life of Caesar. In fact,
Plutarch is an instructive place for us to begin this discus-
sion. Plutarch is clear that he writes the Lives to offer psy-
chological insights into his subjects. He selects those sayings
and anecdotes which offer “signs of a man’s soul.” Yet
Plutarch has a further aim in mind: he wants his reader to
become more moral. The virtue of his subjects, he claims,
“by the bare statement of its actions, can so affect men’s
minds as to create at once both admiration of things done
and desire to imitate the doers of them.”55 Plutarch’s Lives
are often taken to have a morally beneficial effect upon the
reader. Hence: “Plutarch taught me high thoughts; he ele-
vated me above the wretched sphere of my own reflections
to admire and love the heroes of past ages.” So, at least, says
Dr Frankenstein’s creature.56
The case with Nietzsche is much more confusing. Does he,
like Plutarch, intend that we come away with an idea of how
to act or, if not to act, then how in general to live? On a care-
ful reading of Twilight, this question doesn’t yield a yes or no
answer. There is a conflict embodied in the text: on the one
hand, Nietzsche is careful not to offer a freedom we can re-
alistically aim for; on the other hand, he doesn’t present a
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value-neutral account of freedom and decadence. I’ll say a lit-
tle more about each of the horns of this dilemma.
On the one hand, then, it’s not clear how we could realize
Nietzschean freedom. The three “free” people discussed in
this essay remain somewhat elusive as objects of aspiration.
Yes, the liberals are in a sense “free,” but only when they
aren’t in power (when they are in power, they undermine
freedom). Socrates achieves a limited freedom—but only by
ending his own life. The best option looks to be Caesar, the
“highest type” of free man. Obviously, it wouldn’t be appro-
priate to copy Caesar. We don’t have Caesar’s inner psyche;
nor do we face the same challenges, environment, back-
ground, and so on. More specifically, we can’t even aim for
the general structure of Caesar’s freedom. It’s not enough to
seek out conflict, as is clear from the Napoleon case. If we
tried to turn Caesar’s case into a general formula, it would go
something like this: “Be born stronger than those around
you; then make sure that your strengths lead you into trou-
ble, so that you begin to doubt and mistrust them; see that
the resultant inner turmoil nearly destroys you, such that you
constantly overcome it (but only just).” I don’t have to spell
out the absurdity of trying to act on such a principle.
On the other hand, we can’t read Nietzsche as a neutral
describer of states of affairs. I doubt any reader of Twilight,
or any other Nietzsche text, could conclude that Nietzsche
doesn’t wish to influence us with his writing. That, presum-
ably, is why he chooses to speak in terms of “decadence”
and “freedom”; after all, these are not value-neutral terms,
and he could easily have chosen others. Twilight, and its ex-
ploration of decadence, amounts to a description of what is
wrong with the world. I don’t say we have to choose be-
tween these two options: we don’t have to say that Niet-
zsche definitely does or doesn’t want us to act in response to
his analysis. But I do present this as a problem for Nietzsche
and one of which he demonstrates a certain awareness.
I have said that Caesar represents a kind of productive
tension: not too little (Napoleon) and not too much (Cati-
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line). Nietzsche contrasts productive tension with “‘peace of
soul,’ the Christian desideratum.” “Peace of soul” represents
the aim of having no tension at all, which Nietzsche
ridicules. “Peace of soul,” he tells us, is more often than not
“something else which is just unable to give itself a more
modest name,” for example, “laziness persuaded by vanity
to dress itself up in moral garb.” Note that this is an exam-
ple of the typical Nietzschean argument I discussed at the
start. What kind of person could possibly want “peace of
soul”? The answer (for example): a lazy person who wants
to pretend that he’s doing something moral. The section
ends: “Twilight of the Idols: who knows? Perhaps just an-
other kind of ‘peace of soul.’”57
Admittedly, this passage is far from lucid. But it is expli-
cable in the context of my claims about Twilight. We might
expect Nietzsche’s freedom to furnish us with some kind of
goal or aim, but Twilight offers us nothing of the sort. Why
did Nietzsche write it, then? Here, I think, Nietzsche seems
to acknowledge that Twilight is itself unproductive, just a
kind of “peace of soul.” Hence, not only does Twilight give
us no specific moral instruction—it doesn’t even leave us
confident that such a thing is possible; and yet it reminds us
again and again of the lamentable, decadent state of mod-
ern life. Freedom in Twilight isn’t something you can aim
for, and this must call into question Nietzsche’s reasons for
writing it. I don’t necessarily see that he has a solution to
this problem: “But in the end,” he laments in the final sec-
tion of the Streifzüge, “who knows if I even want to be read
today?”58
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